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Abstract
Among the strategic choices made by today’s economic actors are
choices about algorithms and computational resources. Different access
to computational resources may result in a kind of economic asymme-
try analogous to information asymmetry. In order to represent strate-
gic computational choices within a game theoretic framework, we pro-
pose a new game specification, Strategic Bayesian Networks (SBN). In
an SBN, random variables are represented as nodes in a graph, with
edges indicating probabilistic dependence. For some nodes, players
can choose conditional probability distributions as a strategic choice.
Using SBN, we present two games that demonstrate computational
asymmetry. These games are symmetric except for the computational
limitations of the actors. We show that the better computationally
endowed player receives greater payoff.
In competitive arenas such as computational finance, web search and
advertising, Internet security, and AI challenges, adoption of computer pro-
grams is an important strategic choice made by economic agents. One limit-
ing factor to the adoption of these programs is the computational resources
available for processing. This introduces a new potential for economic asym-
metry, analogous to information asymmetry: computational asymmetry.
Actors may be symmetrical in all respects except for their capacity to com-
pute. Intuitively, we might guess that more computationally powerful play-
ers will often be better off. Under what conditions is this the case, and
how can we model situations where computational strategies are in play?
Algorithmic game theory offers a strong foundation for analyzing this phe-
nomenon, but we believe a new theoretical apparatus would assist us.
In order to demonstrate the potential effect of computational asymmetry
on economic agents, we develop a new kind of game specification: a Strategic
Bayesian network (SBN). Strategic Bayesian networks are an extension of
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Bayesian networks, a powerful form of representing conditional probabilities
over many random variables, and influence diagrams, which extend Bayes
networks to represent decision problems. SBN further extends the Bayes
network model to include strategic choices by multiple actors.
In Section 1, we will define SBN and show that games in SBN form are
reducible to extensive form, proving that other concepts from game theory
like theory of Nash Equilibrium can be applied to them. In Section 2, we will
show how SBN is able to model computational strategies in games in a way
that is difficult for extensive form, because of the explosive expansion of the
decision tree. In Section 3, we will use SBN to demonstrate the phenomenon
of computational asymmetry in a trivial sense: where one economic actor is
unable to process all the available input data pertinent to game outcome.
In Section 4, we demonstrate a more substantive kind of computational
asymmetry, where the stronger player is able to consistently outsmart the
weaker player due to the computational complexity of the game itself. We
will conclude with implications and directions for future research in Section
5.
1 Strategic Bayesian networks
Bayesian Networks are widely used as a representation of probabilistic knowl-
edge and reasoning. A Bayes net is a graphical model in which nodes repre-
sent random variables and edges show the conditional dependencies of nodes
on each other. The complete distribution over variables is defined by this
structure and explicit probability distribution for the value of each node,
conditional on the node’s parents. There are efficient ways of simulating
and computing the result of these distributions [4]. We propose Strategic
Bayesian networks as a game theoretic extension to Bayes networks.
The intuition behind Strategic Bayes networks is that we can make these
probabilistic graphical models into games by allowing actors to choose the
conditional probability function at some of a graph’s nodes, and assigning
the actors payoffs based on the values of other nodes.
We can think of this game having two stages. In the first stage, players
look at the interconnected events in the game domain and determine how
to “program” the nodes that are under their control. When all strategically
controlled nodes are programmed, the SBN is a fully specified Bayesian Net-
work, with the augmentation that some nodes correspond to player utility.
In the second stage, the game “happens”, and the events are sampled ac-
cording to the Bayes network distribution. The players reap benefits or
penalties depending on the value of the payoff nodes. To win the game, the
players need to program the SBN in a way that will maximize their expected
utilities.
Though graphical, SBN’s are significantly different from graphical games.
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Graphical games are used to compactly represent games with very large
numbers of players. A node represents a player, whose payoff depends only
the actions of itself and the players from which it has incoming edges. Kearns
[2], comparing graphical games with graphical models for probabilistic in-
ference including (non-strategic) Bayesian networks, writes that “in prob-
abilistic inference, interactions are stochastic, whereas in graphical games
they are strategic (best response).” We propose that Strategic Bayes Net-
works can succinctly bridge probabilistic inference and game theory to model
situations with both stochastic and strategic interactions.
1.1 Definition of a Strategic Bayesian network
Define a Strategic Bayesian network (SBN) over a directed acyclic graph,
G = (V,E), where V are nodes and E are edges. In a standard Bayes
network, each node represents a random variable whose probability function
takes the possible values of its parents as input. For an SBN, one extends
this model with the following:
• n players
• The nodes V partitioned into three subsets:
– C, a set of Chance nodes
– R, a set of Strategic nodes,
– Π, a set of Payoff nodes, one per player
• For every Chance node c ∈ C, a probability function fc that defines,
for every possible value of that c’s parents, a probability distribution
over a set of possible values Dc
• For every Strategic node r ∈ R, a player associate with that node
q(r) and a set of possible actions, Ar. Each member of Ar must be a
function from the possible values of r’s parent nodes to a probability
distribution over the nodes’s possible values, Dr.
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• For every node pi ∈ Π, an associated player q(pi) and a function fpi from
the possible values of its parents to a probability distribution over real
numbers ℜ, which is the utility awarded to the player upon playing the
game. To simplify graphical representation, in games below we elide
1A simpler variation of SBN would constrain the possible actions a ∈ Ar to functions
that produce deterministic outcomes. This constraint would not result in loss of generality
since one could construct the game graph with a single-parent Chance node as the child
of every Strategic node. However, this would break the correspondence between a fully
programmed SBN and classic Bayes Net. We also leverage the probabilistic nature of the
strategic nodes in one of our proofs below to simulate the choice of a mixed strategy in a
strategic subgame.
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these payoff nodes into a single node, whose values can be thought of
as tuples of real numbers that correspond to each players’ payoff in
order.
When presenting an SBN graph visually, we have adopted the nota-
tional convention of denoting Chance nodes with a single elliptical outline,
Strategic nodes with a double elliptical outline, and Payoff nodes with a
rectangular outline.
When players play a SBN game, the entire specification of the SBN is
made available to them. Then, without coordination or observation, for
each strategic node r ∈ R the player q(r) picks an action ar ∈ Ar. Players
choose their action rationally in an effort to maximize their expected utility
from the payoff nodes Π. Once the actions have been chosen, all the random
variables are sampled once according to the probability distributions fi and
ai. The nodes are sampled in depth order. In this way, first the values of
nodes with no parents are determined (their probability functions take no
inputs), and each remaining node can take its inputs from values already
sampled. When all nodes are determined, payoffs are awarded to the players.
1.2 Reduction of SBN to Extensive Form Game
In order to show that SBN games are the kind of game to which we can
apply game theoretic notions such as best response and Nash equilibrium,
we here sketch the reduction from an SBN to an extensive form game.
To perform the reduction, construct a game tree starting with each of
the strategic nodes r ∈ R, with the same number of players as the SBN.
For the root of the tree, pick a ρ ∈ R and make a corresponding root
node vρ. Let vρ be a node of player q(ρ) with a branch for each element of
Aρ.
For each remaining r ∈ R, put a node that belongs to player q(r) at the
end of the branches of the preceding nodes. Give them each a branch for
every action in Ar.
At this point, the constructed game tree will have several tiers of non-
Chance nodes. Each tier will correspond to a single Strategic node in the
SBN, and all the nodes in a tier will have the same player. Each leaf of this
tree w will correspond to a set of choices, one for each Strategic node in the
SBN. In other words, each leaf “fully programs” the original SBN.
Next comes the tricky part: putting these nodes into the appropriate
information sets. Recall that in an extensive form game, an information set
is a set of nodes between which a player cannot discriminate at the moment
of their choice. In an SBN, each player knows their own action choices,
but not other players. In the extensive form reduction of an SBN, players
need perfect recall [6] but have no knowledge of other players’ moves. To
accomplish this in the reduction, apply the following rule: for every non-
chance node in the tree corresponding to a Strategic node r in the SBN,
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assign it to an information set with every other tree node corresponding to
r that shares in its path to the tree root any and all actions played at other
nodes by player q(r). Thus, in the ‘sequential’ extensive form of an SBN, a
player’s choice of action is made with only the knowledge of that players’
previous actions.
For each leaf w, unfold this Bayesian network into a subtree of (extensive
form) Chance nodes, in depth order. For each node in the Bayesian network
u, put a node at each leaf of the graph that branches for all values in Du with
probabilities assigned by the distribution returned by fu or au (whichever is
appropriate) when given the input values represented by the the path from
the node to the subtree root.
When a layer of payoff nodes are introduced in this way, branch on a
Chance node as usual but label that branch with the payoff awarded for the
corresponding player according to fpi.
When all of the Bayesian network nodes have been used to generate
game tree nodes in this way, assign to each leaf the n-tuple of payoffs for
each player based on the labels on the path from it to the game tree root.
This concludes the construction of the extensive form game from an
SBN. The number of nodes in this tree will be equal to 1 +
∏
u∈V Du, not
including the payoff leaves. This number may be infinite.
2 Computational strategies
As we have discussed, we believe that an advantage of the Strategic Bayesian
network formalism is that it can model games in which a player’s choice
of moves is subject to complexity constraints. One way to do this is to
restrict the choice of actions at a players’ strategic node to a complexity
class. We believe that this technique has the expressive power to represent
computational games in a way that is difficult to do with extensive form
games alone.
2.1 A simple example
Consider playing the following single player game, NoCount: you receive
a string of random bits of length n, each generated from an even coin toss.
The variable n has been generated from an exponential distribution with
parameter λ. You are allowed to write a program that takes the string as
input and returns an integer g between 0 and n. If g is equal to the sum of
all the 1’s in the string, you get a prize. Otherwise, you get nothing. The
catch is that your program must be an algorithm that runs in constant time
in the worst case.
We can specify this game using an SBN with the following graphical
structure:
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ax
b p
Here, λ is a variable exogenous to the model. The function fa is the
exponential distribution (or, better, a distribution with an undefined mean)
with parameter λ, rounded up. The function fb is the function that takes an
integer n and returns s, a string of 0’s and 1’s according to a fair coin toss.
I.e., it is the result of a Bernoulli process of length n with p = .5. Ax = O(1).
fpi takes two inputs, g and s and returns a deterministic distribution, either
1 if g =
∑
s and 0 otherwise.
We make two observations. First, the complexity restriction is a frus-
tration for the player of NoCount. Without this restriction, the player
could program node x to simply count the number of 1’s in s and return the
answer. But as this is a linear time function, this is not a possible choice.
Rather, the player must do the best she can in constant time. We raise as a
conjecture that the player’s best to choice for ax is the function that ignores
its input and returns round( 1
2λ
). We leave the proof or refutation of this
claim as an open problem.
Second, we note that this SBN representation is quite compact com-
pared to an equivalent extensive form game. Shoehorning the problem into
a formal game tree definition would require a separate derivation from the
complexity class O(1) at almost every level of the formalism: the predeces-
sor function, the partitioning into information sets, the action set, and the
probability function determining the behavior of the nature nodes (recall
that there is a separate nature node for every O(1) function. We leave this
exercise of specifying NoCount as an extensive form game as another open
problem.
3 Trivial Computational Asymmetry
We have shown how to use Strategic Bayes Networks to model games with
complexity constraints. We now want to explore games with computational
asymmetry, which we believe is a new concept in economics. The intu-
ition behind computational asymmetry is that when players in an otherwise
symmetric game have different capacities resources at their disposal, this
condition can provide an advantage to the better computationally endowed
player.
Consider a new game, TwoPlayerNoCount, with this SBN structure:
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b y pi
In this game, a and b are defined as before. But x and y are controlled
by different players. The values of b, x, and y all go to to determine the
payoffs at pi. If both guesses are correct (i.e. x = y = sum(b)), the two
players split the prize. If neither guesses correctly, neither gets the prize. If
only one guesses correctly, the player that guessed correctly wins the prize.
To introduce the idea of computational asymmetry, we will give
the player controlled nodes different action sets. Let Ax = O(1). But let
Ay = O(n).
y’s player can guarantee greater expected utility in this game because
summing the 1’s in the string from b is within their action set, whereas
x’s player has to find some constant time approximation. In this otherwise
symmetric game, the player that controls y has an advantage that is due to
a difference in computational power.
3.1 Some early conclusions
The TwoPlayerNoCount example suggests several concepts that could
come into play in other situations with computational asymmetry.
First, note that the game structure faces the players with a decision
problem with a certain computational complexity– in this case, linear com-
plexity. If both players were able to pick strategies of this complexity or
greater, then asymmetry would have no effect on expected utility. Com-
putational asymmetry surfaces when one or more players is insufficiently
equipped to guarantee them the maximum possible utility in the game.
Second, note that the computational power of one player in this example
negatively effects the other player. Because y’s player always guesses the
correct value, x’s player will never get the full prize. Meanwhile, y’s player
can capitalize on the x players’ lack of computational power by claiming the
full prize whenever the latter guesses incorrectly.
Third, the x players’ disadvantage is due to the fact that x is not able to
choose a strategy that uses all the information available to it. More specif-
ically, though x’s player has perfect information about the game itself, the
function at x loses information provided to it by its conditioning variables.
This last point explains a trivial way that computational asymmetry can
effect game outcome. More interesting and analytically challenging cases
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involve situations where strategic nodes are computationally strong enough
to read their entire ”input” from conditioning variables, but are not strong
enough to ”solve” for the function that would maximize their player’s payoff.
To illustrate such a case, we will introduce one more game.
4 Substantive Computational Assymetry
LetsPlay is a game defined by an SBN with two players. It has the struc-
ture shown below, with the payoff nodes elided for simplicity.
SA
piSBG
G is a Chance node. Its range of possible values DG is all possible sym-
metric zero sum games with payoff matrix sized n× n. For our purposes, n
may be drawn from any distribution that assigns positive mass to all posi-
tive integers, such as an exponential distribution, and payoff matrix values
are populated from a normal distribution rounded to some decimal place,
subject to the symmetry and zero sum constraints. This will guarantee that
for roughly any symmetric game g there is some probability mass P (G = g).
Sa and Sb are strategic nodes for players A and B, respectively. For
both nodes, their range of possible values is a positive integer index into
the matrix representing the subgame–or, a pure strategy for the subgame g.
The action sets AS are both subsets of the functions that map from game
matrices to mixed strategies in those games. Recall that mixed strategies
are themselves distributions over pure strategies. So these strategic nodes
fulfill the SBN requirement that action sets must be comprised of functions
from node inputs to probability distributions over possible node values.
Consider for a moment some well-established results in algorithmic game
theory. Nash proved that symmetric games always have a symmetric Nash
equilibrium in which all players play identical mixed strategies.[1] Papadim-
itriou [3] has shown that the problem of finding a symmetric Nash Equi-
librium of a symmetric game is PPAD-hard, and notes that the problem of
finding symmetric or non-symmetric Nash equilibrium to symmetric games
is possibly easier. It is well-known that solving for Nash equilibria of zero-
sum games in normal form is reducible to a linear programming problem.[5]
This proof depends on the complexity of two problems on the domain
of normal form games that are both symmetric and zero sum. The first,
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which we will call zero sum symmetric nash is the problem of finding a
strategy m such that if played by both players, there is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium.
The second problem, which we will call the responder problem, is:
given a symmetric zero sum game in normal form g, find a mixed strategy
m such that there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy n for g and
m is a best response to n.
We are not aware of theorems that determine the complexity of these
problems, but our proof depends only on the existence of their worst-case
complexity bounds. Note that solving zero sum symmetric nash solves
responder, so responder is at most as hard as zero sum symmetric
nash.
To introduce computational asymmetry into LetsPlay, we pick a uni-
versal computing language and a machine implementation for the purpose
of evaluating function complexity. Next, we define as O(w(n)) the tightest
worst case performance bound for an algorithm that can solve zero sum
symmetric nash. If this is a polynomial complexity problem, for example,
w(n) might be nk for some constant k. We restrict Sa to functions that
are within this complexity bound. We then restrict Sb to a strictly lesser
bound. Let O(x(n)) be the tightest worst case performance bound for any
algorithms that can solve responder. Define y to be any function that is
strictly less than x such that w(n) ≥ x(n) > y(n) for all n. Sb is limited to
functions in O(y(n)). The upshot of this is that Player A will be able to pick
strategy N , which computes a symmetric Nash Equilibrium strategy given
any game g, and Player B will not be able to use a strategy that reliable
computes best responses to N(g).
The payoff nodes in pi simply award players according their pure strate-
gies and the payoff matrix provided by G.
4.1 Proof of computational asymmetry effect on utility
Player A can guarantee that they “win” this game by playing strategy N . By
this we mean that Player A can guarantee that they have positive expected
payoff and Player B has negative expected payoff, despite the game being
perfectly symmetrical except for the computational limits on the players’
strategies.
Why is this the case? Suppose Player A plays strategy N , meaning
that for any payoff matrix g, Sa(g) = N(g) and N(g) is a symmetric Nash
Equilibrium strategy for g. For at least some games g, Sb(g) 6= N(g), because
otherwise Sb = N and this is not allowed given Player B’s computational
range.
For the games where Sb(g) = N(g), the expected payoff of both players
is 0, since the strategies are identical and the game is symmetric and zero
sum.
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For the cases where Sb(g) 6= N(g), we consider whether Sb(g) is a best
response to N(g). If Sb(g) is a best response to N(g), then for all strate-
gies m, the payoff of playing m against N(g), u(m,N(g)), must be no
greater than u(Sb(g), N(g)). However, N(g) is a best response to itself, so
u(N(g), N(g)) ≥ u(Sb(g), N(g)). Hence, u(Sb(g), N(g)) = u(N(g), N(g)) =
0 for these cases
However, Player B is not able to reliably solve the responder problem
because of its computational range. Therefor, there must be some g such
that Sb(g) 6= N(g) and Sb(g) is not a best response to N(g). In these cases,
Player B’s expected payoff in playing Sb(g) against N(g) must be negative,
because u(Sb(g), N(g)) < u(N(g), N(g)) = 0. Since g is a payoff matrix for
a zero sum game, Player A’s payoff in these cases must be positive.
Consider LetsPlay as a whole. If Player A picks Sa = N , then what-
ever Player B chooses for Sb, then the expected payoff for Player A must be
positive, because there will be at least one subgame g with positive probabil-
ity for which A gets positive expected payoff, and the other games will have
tied payoffs at 0. So, Player A can guarantee that they win at LetsPlay
purely in virtue of the game’s computational asymmetry.
4.2 Discussion and Potential Variations
We have presented LetsPlay as a simple example of how computational
asymmetry might affect economic game outcomes. Unlike TwoPlayer-
NoCount, both players are able to “read” the complete “input” provided
to them by the games’ chance conditions. However, nevertheless the com-
putationally stronger player can guarantee their advantage.
Our argument has a weakness: if the worst-case complexity bound for
responder is O(n2), the same complexity as reading the game payoff ma-
trix, the computational asymmetry in LetsPlay is trivial as in the previous
section and not what we call “substantive”.
We have not shown whether N is Player A’s best available strategy, or
what Player B’s best strategy is. We have also only been able to show that
Player A can eek out some advantage, with no regard for size or significance.
We also acknowledge that the players’ computational ranges are contrived.
We hope that this result is robust enough to be suggestive of more significant
results to be discovered by brighter minds.
Several variations of LetsPlay have so far eluded our analysis. We offer
as a conjecture that the effect of computational asymmetry can be proven
when one or both of the symmetry and zero-sum conditions are lifted from
the G node.
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5 Discussion
The use of abstract complexity classes in the foregoing analysis raises doubts
about its applicability to “real world” problems, since these classes are de-
fined in terms of unbounded constants. A more compelling demonstration
of computational asymmetry would involve finite bounds on computational
complexity. Future work could apply circuit complexity classes to SBN to
achieve this.
We anticipate other uses of SBN beyond the proofs provided here. Bayesian
networks are a powerful way to represent any stochastic domain with discrete
events. SBN’s allow these networks to represent domains where strategic
agency is a factor. For example, SBN’s might be used to model informa-
tion flow within an organization. In a principal-agent scenario, an agent
may observe (be a child of) events and then file a report about them to
the principal. A principal might choose to investigate the event, reward,
or reprimand the agent based on the contents of the report. There may be
several Nash equilibria of reporting and responding strategies identifiable in
an SBN model of this situation.
While we have provided a formal proof using the SBN construct in this
paper, SBN’s may prove to be a flexible basis for implementing and test-
ing game theoretic simulations. Recall that algorithms for computing over
Bayes Networks are well-known. Especially with more restricted action sets
at strategic nodes, SBN’s may provide a way to rapidly simulate strate-
gic choices in a stochastic domain and converge on optimal or equilibrium
strategies.
Overall, we hope that our mathematical analysis of computational asym-
metry using Strategic Bayes Networks will pique the curiosity of the al-
gorithmic game theory community. While the concept of computational
asymmetry is intuitively compelling, as far as we know there have been no
attempts to model such situations game-theoretically and in a way informed
by complexity theory. We hope others can do more with the tools and ideas
sketched here.
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